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Enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act: What Role Should the
Federal Government Play?
BY ALEX WALDROP*
INTRODUCTION
One of the ironies of modern civil rights legislation is that
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
was granted primary "authority and responsibility for
administering' the Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968)2 but was given no real power to
enforce Title VIII beyond methods to achieve voluntary com-
pliance.' Because the role of the Attorney General in enforce-
ment is also "minimal, ' 4 the enormous task of assuring equal
access to housing falls primarily on private litigants who must
* Associate, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Kentucky. B.A. 1975, Western
Kentucky University; M.A. 1982, Fuller Theological Seminary; J.D. 1985, University of
Kentucky. The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and technical assistance of
Professor Robert G. Schwemm.
EDITOR'S NOTE: As this Article went to press, a bill to amend title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 was introduced in the United States Senate. See S. 2040, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S848-57 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1982).
Id. at §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982) provides that the Secretary.of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter cited as HUD] "shall proceed to try to
eliminate or correct [any] alleged discriminatory housing practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."
4 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613 limits involvement by the Attorney General to instances of discrimination estab-
lishing "a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
granted by [Title VIll]" or denials of Title VIII rights raising "an issue of general public
importance." For discussions of the Justice Department's role in Federal Fair Housing
Act enforcement, see Selig, The Justice Department and Racially Exclusionary Municipal
Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Act Enforcement, 17 U.C.D. L. Rv. 445
(1983-84); Sloane, Federal Housing Policy and Equal Opportunity, reprinted in A
Sheltered Crisis: The State of Fair Housing in the Eighties, United States Commission
on Civil Rights 133 (1983).
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act on their own behalf "as private attorneys general in vin-
dicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority."
' 5
While some believe that private litigation should remain the
primary generating force in assuring fair housing, 6 recent HUD
studies indicate that discrimination in housing continues to be
common and widespread.7 One nationwide survey concluded
that if a black visits four apartment complexes, "there is a 72
percent chance that he or she will be discriminated against at
least once." ' 8 Likewise, researchers concluded that prospective
black home buyers visiting four sales firms risk a 48 percent
chance of encountering discrimination in the sales market. 9 Ti-
tle VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 embodies a congres-
sional promise to eradicate discrimination in housing. To fulfill
that promise, a more effective enforcement system must be
devised.
In his 1983 State of the Union Address, President Reagan,
recognizing that housing discrimination still exists, committed
his Administration to increased enforcement of the fair hous-
ing laws.' 0 Accordingly, Reagan proposed Senate Bill 1612"1 to
the Ninety-eighth Congress. The bill would have amended Title
VIII by authorizing the United States Attorney General to pur-
sue individual victim cases in which HUD's conciliation efforts
409 U.S. at 211 (quoting from an amicus curiae brief submitted by former
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold).
6 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act: Hearings on H.R. 3504 and H.R. 7787 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1978) (testimony of Avery S. Friedman, Chief Counsel, the Housing
Advocates, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Fair Housing Act, Hearings]; Scanlon, A Report
on the Committee's Fair Housing Project 1975-1983 19 (1983) (prepared for the fifteenth
anniversary program of the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law).
, See generally HUD, Recent Evidence on Discrimination in Housing, Office of
Policy Development and Research, (1984) [hereinafter cited as Recent Evidence].
Id. at 13.
SId.
° See 129 CONG. REc. H126, H. 128 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1983) (1983 State of the Union
Address by President Ronald Reagan).
S. 1612, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See 129 CONG. REc. S9880 (daily ed.
July 13, 1983) ("President Reagan's action today [introducing S. 1612] reaffirms what
he declared in his state of the Union message earlier this year.") (statement of Sen.
Howard Baker).
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failed to resolve the matter satisfactorily.' 2 Civil rights groups
and others have long recognized the inadequacy of Title VIII
and have pushed for an administrative enforcement proce-
dure.'" Similar to the Reagan Administration proposal, the ad-
ministrative enforcement procedure advocated by civil rights
groups would serve as a back-up to the conciliation process.
This procedure would be unique, however, in that it would
place administrative enforcement power either with HUD or
with a separate fair housing commission.' 4 Senate Bill 1220,'5
introduced by Senator Charles Mathias in the Ninety-eighth
Congress, is a recent example of the administrative enforce-
ment approach. With the Reagan Administration now actively
pursuing a change in fair housing enforcement, the debate has
focused on how the enforcement procedures of Title VIII
should be amended. As the following legislative history makes
clear, however, there has always been a divergence of opinion
concerning the role of the federal government in Fair Housing
Act enforcement.'
6
After first looking at relevant legislative history underlying
the most recent proposals, this Article considers the strengths
and weaknesses of the administrative alternative, using the Reagan
Administration's proposal as a critical tool. Relying in part
on the experience of the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights
in administering and enforcing Kentucky's fair housing laws
outside the courtroom setting, a middle ground approach will
be offered that provides a variety of avenues for enforcing the
Fair Housing Act. This intermediate approach not only grants
HUD administrative enforcement power, but also acknowledges
the role both private litigation and the United States Attorney
General may play in assuring plaintiffs full damage recovery.
See S. 1612, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(g), at 9-11.
See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 323 (statement of Arthur
S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
" See Administration and S. 1220 (Mathias), Fair Housing Amendments Proposals,
HUD, Office of the General Counsel 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Administration and
S. 1220].
51 S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For a complete discussion of this bill, see
notes 99-107 infra and accompanying text.
I'. See notes 17-42 infra and accompanying text.
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Disagreement concerning the need for a nonjudicial method
of enforcement has surrounded federal fair housing legislation
since its inception. Although the earliest fair housing proposal,
introduced in the Eighty-ninth Congress, contained no tech-
nique for administrative relief, 7 the proposal was amended in
1966 by adding HUD enforcement power to "provide a more
expeditious and less burdensome method of resolving housing
complaints."' 8 Congress rejected this early amendment.' 9 Fair
housing legislation introduced in 1967 by then-Senator Walter
F. Mondale, Senate Bill 1358,20 gave HUD responsibility for
both administering and enforcing the Act, including the power
to hold hearings and issue appropriate orders where discrimi-
nation was found to exist.2' When the House version of the
Fair Housing Act, House Resolution 2516,2 reached the Senate
in 1968, Senate Bill 1358 was grafted onto the House measure
in the form of the Mondale-Brooke amendment.2 After several
unsuccessful attempts at passage of the Act with HUD's en-
forcement power intact, the Mondale-Brooke amendment was
withdrawn in favor of a compromise offered by Senator Everett
Dirkson24 that reduced HUD's enforcement powers to (the now
familiar) "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion." ' 2  Congress ultimately enacted the Dirkson com-
promise as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.26
" See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, l05 (1979).
'* Id. See also id. at 105 n.15 (citing remarks by Rep. John Conyers explaining
the need for the addition of administrative remedies to House Resolution 14,765).
" The 89th Congress failed to pass any fair housing legislation. A Senate filibuster
prevented action on House Resolution 14,765 as amended by the House Judiciary
Committee to include administrative enforcement power. See 112 CONG. REc. 1183
(1966).
S0 . 1358, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
See id. at § 9.
22 H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
z See Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASH-
BURN L.J. 149, 152 (1968-69).
20 See id. at 156-57. See also 114 CONG. REC. S1877, S1883 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1968).
, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982).
16 See 114 CONG. REC. H2826 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1968). For a complete discussion
of the events leading to the final passage of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
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Within three years of Title VIII's enactment, Congress con-
ducted hearings concerning the role of the federal government
in assuring equal opportunity in housing. 27 Testimony of some
fifteen witnesses appearing before those early congressional
hearings made evident the serious inadequacies both in the law
and in various agencies' enforcement efforts. 28 Congress later
studied discrimination in suburbia, in rural America, and in
housing programs administered by the Veterans Administra-
tion,29 concluding not only that discrimination was still "na-
tional in scope" but also that it was "supported or tolerated
by government agencies." 30 As a result, House Resolution 35043'
and House Resolution 778732 were introduced in the Ninety-
fifth Congress in 1977. The former granted HUD administra-
tive enforcement power similar to that found in Senator Mon-
dale's ill-fated Senate Bill 1358. The latter granted HUD power
to institute private litigation on behalf of Title VIII complain-
ants. 33 As before, extensive hearings were conducted. 34 When
the Ninety-sixth Congress convened in 1979, sponsors of the
earlier amendments took the suggestions and comments and
redrafted a new resolution, House Resolution 2540.35 Based al-
most entirely on House Resolution 3504, the new resolution
was submitted to Congress.3 6 After yet another extensive hear-
see Dubofsky, supra note 23, at 149-60, and R. Scxvmni, HOUSING DIscRIMINATION
LAW 32-36 (1983).
27 See Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal Opportunity in
Housing: Hearings Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-72).
- See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1980, H.R. RaP. No. 865, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 865].
-' See id. at 2 nn.3-5, 3 n.6.
Id. at 3.
" H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Fair Housing Act, Hearings,
supra note 6, at 422.
1 H.R. 7787, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in Fair Housing Act, Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 442.
11 See H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 3.
,4 See generally Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6 (In 1978, the subcom-
mittee conducted seven days of hearings in which seventeen witnesses testified and over
fifty-four additional comments were received.).
H.R. 2540, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
See H.R. RP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 3.
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ing process in 1979,' 7 House Resolution 2540 was reported fa-
vorably out of the House subcommittee as a clean resolution
(subsequently introduced as House Resolution 5200) and was
thereafter reported favorably to the floor of the House.3 Al-
though the measure passed in the House, it was ultimately
withdrawn from the Senate on December 9, 1980, after a clo-
ture motion to end a Senate filibuster failed.39
Since that time there have been efforts in both the Ninety-
seventh 4 and Ninety-eighth 4' Congresses to reintroduce legis-
lation affecting in some way HUD's enforcement powers. But
as before, disagreement regarding who should enforce the fair
housing laws has left Congress without a solution.42
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT POWER
While there is a consensus of opinion concerning the need
for stronger enforcement of Title VIII, 43 the issue remains "how
best to improve the law." 44 What follows is a consideration of
arguments commonly put forth when debating the merits of
" See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2540 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hear-
ings].
" H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 3.
" See 126 CONG. Rnc. S15,853 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980). See also R. Scnwnx,
supra note 26, at 230 n.27.
4 S. 570, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Charles Mathias).
S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Sen. Mathias); S. 1612,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Reagan Administration's bill introduced by Sen. Baker);
H.R. 3482, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (companion to Mathias Fair Housing Bill); H.R.
3747, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (companion to Administration's bill); 5. 140, 9,th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Sen. Orin Hatch).
41 See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the disagree-
ments in the 98th Congress. As of this writing, only Sen. Hatch has introduced legislation
(S. 139) dealing with HUD's enforcement power, but both the Reagan Administration
and Sen. Mathias have plans to reintroduce legislation early in the 99th Congress.
Telephone interview with Marion Morris, staff counsel for Sen. Mathias (Feb. 18, 1985).
4 Compare 129 CONG. Rac. S6152 (daily ed. May 5, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Mathias introducing Senate Bill 1220) with 129 CoNG. Rac. S9880 (daily ed. July 13,
1983) (statement of Sen. Baker introducing Senate Bill 1612 for the Administration) and
129 CONG. REc. 5625 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch introducing
Senate Bill 140). See also notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
- See Leadership Conf. on Civil Rights, Some Questions and Answers on the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1983 1 (March 14-15, 1984).
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administrative enforcement of Tide VIII, with careful attention
drawn to the evolution of recent legislation in response to the
debate.
A. Arguments by Proponents of Administrative Enforcement
Power
1. Agency Power Facilitates Resolution
at the Conciliation Stage
A basic argument in favor of granting HUD the power to
hold hearings and issue enforcement orders in much the same
manner as other agencie 45 is that this power "is necessary in
order to make [HUD's] present powers of investigation and
conciliation effective in resolving complaints of discrimina-
tion. ' 46 As former Secretary of HUD Patricia Harris ex-
plained:
Respondents frequently ignore HUD's conciliation process
because there is no real inducement to cooperate. Where con-
ciliation is successful, it is most often because the respondent
knows that a realistic threat of private litigation is present,
should HUD's efforts fail.
But where the victim of discrimination meets with the
HUD conciliator and with the respondent, and it is evident
that the complainant is unrepresented by counsel, conciliation
often collapses. There is no credible threat of "consequence"
should the respondent refuse to cooperate. 47
According to former Secretary Harris, the fair housing laws
passed in 1968 indentified the problem but failed to provide
the proper enforcement tools necessary to prevent discrimina-
tion.4 8 Thus, she said, "In the absence of such remedies, con-
41 In 1977, at least sixteen federal agencies had the administrative authority to
issue "cease and desist" orders. See Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 686-
717 (legal memorandum prepared by Congressional Research Service concerning Federal
administrative authority to issue cease and desist orders).
" Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 647-48 (legal
memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service concerning arguments for
and against granting HUD cease and desist authority).
' Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 4-5.
-1 See Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 70.
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ciliation has become more a symbol of impotence than a
constructive tool to redress housing discrimination com-
plaints. '49 Others agree that this lack of adequate enforcement
power is primarily responsible for the failure of the federal
government in reaching the goals of the Fair Housing Act."
Nonetheless, former Secretary Harris and others believe that
when enforcement authority backs the conciliation process,
conciliation is "highly effective in bringing respondents to the
table, resolving complaints speedily, and providing access to
disputed housing."'" It is expected that, with the administrative
remedy, a high percentage of disputes will be resolved without
resort to hearings or orders.5 2 In fact, evidence supports this
conclusion.1
3
Private suits remain critical if fair housing laws "are to be
taken seriously by those in a position to violate them. ' '54
Nonetheless, private litigation simply does not provide the
needed incentive to resolve disputes at the conciliation table.
Private suits are not only expensive,55 but also time consuming
and slow to resolve. 6 Although attorney's fees may be awarded
49 Id.
See, e.g., id. at 4 (statement of Drew S. Days III, former Assist. Atty. Gen.,
Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
s Id. at 71. See also H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 6.
See H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 5-6.
" See notes 180-191 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kentucky
Human Rights Commission's apparent success in utilizing the conciliation process in
conjunction with agency enforcement power.
11 Scanlon, supra note 6, at 19. See also Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note
6, at 146 (testimony of Avery S. Friedman, Chief Counsel, the Housing Advocates,
Inc.) (high jury verdicts needed to deter violation of Title VIII). Litigation is also needed
to ensure that disputes involving new or complicated issues of law or fact are fairly
decided. Recognizing this fact, Senate Bill 1220, which advocated administrative enforce-
ment, required that charges involving "any novel issues of law or fact or other compli-
cating factors" be referred to the Attorney General. S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7,
at 20-21 (1983).
" See Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (testimony of Patricia Harris,
former Secretary of HUD) ("The most significant deterrent to litigation remains its high
cost.").
16 See Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 175 (testi-
mony of former HUD Secretary Robert Weaver). One study has concluded that, on the
average, the period between the time of filing and the date of the court's final order is
approximately twenty-one months. See H.R. RaP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 5 n.18.
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to prevailing plaintiffs under present statutes,57 few attorneys
have been willing to accept such cases.5 8 As a result, "all but
those most persistent and steadfast in their determination to
exercise rights guaranteed by the statutes"5 9 are discouraged
from utilizing their private remedy.
Accepting the premise that a backup mechanism is needed
to make the conciliation process fully effective, the Reagan
Administration, during the Ninety-eighth Congress, opted not
for administrative enforcement but for judicial enforcement with
substantially higher penalties.6 Primary reliance for dispute
resolution would continue to be on the more speedy, informal
conciliation method. Under the Administration's proposal, if
after 30 days the parties did not agree to conciliate, the Sec-
retary of HUD could refer the case to the United States At-
torney General with a recommendation that a civil action be
commenced on behalf of the complainant in federal court.6'
This option would expand the present jurisdiction of the Jus-
tice Department beyond the so-called "pattern or practice"
cases62 to include cases involving victims of individualized dis-
crimination.
In theory, suits by the Justice Department would provide
the needed impetus to conciliate. In practice, however, reliance
on Justice Department officials to pursue cases referred by
HUD may be misplaced. The record of the Reagan Adminis-
tration in pursuing civil rights violations is less than exem-
plary.63 Prior to 1980, the Justice Department exercised its
" See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982). Title VIII, unlike the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), permits awards only to prevailing
"plaintiffs" and limits awards to only those plaintiffs who are financially unable to
assume the attorney's fees. See also R. Scswamma, supra note 26, at 269-75.
" See H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 5 & n.19. One author has opined
that private litigation of the fair housing laws can be supported only if larger damage
awards and higher attorney's fees are sought in every case. Scanlon, supra note 6, at
19. Otherwise, private enforcement groups such as the Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law will soon be unable to continue representing their clients. Id.
'" H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 5.
See S. 1612, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(g), at 11 (1983).
" See id. at 9-10. Senate Bill 1220 also provided for Justice Department enforce-
ment, but added the option to refer the complaint to an administrative law judge. See
S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, at 21 (1983).
See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982).
" See Selig, supra note 4, at 504; Sloane, supra note 4, at 140.
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authority in "pattern or practice" cases with "frequency, vigor
and success'' 64 participating in "over three hundred cases in
the first ten years of its enforcement efforts under the Fair
Housing Act." ' 6 In the first three years of the Reagan Admin-
istration, the Justice Department had filed only six Title VIII
cases.
66
One conclusion that has been drawn from the Administra-
tion's record is that Justice Department civil rights enforce-
ment policies, at least in the Reagan era, are ideologically and
politically determined. 67 If the Justice Department is to have
responsibility for enforcing individual Fair Housing Act cases,
it is of paramount importance that potential defendants be cer-
tain that the Justice Department will initiate litigation on be-
half of those injured by discrimination.
The more convinced parties become that failure to concil-
iate will lead to some sort of legal action, the greater will be
the motivation to settle the dispute at the conciliation table.63
Private suits offer little incentive to resolve the matter peace-
ably. Both the Reagan Administration's approach and the ad-
ministrative approach will bolster to some extent the conciliation
conference. However, given the vulnerability of the Justice De-
partment to the claim that it has no enthusiasm for civil rights
enforcement under the present Administration, granting HUD
administrative enforcement power is a better way of insulating
fair housing enforcement efforts from the ideological vicissi-
, Selig, supra note 4, at 446.
65 Id.
' Sloane, supra note 4, at 139-41.
, Joel L. Selig, former Deputy Chief of the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice responsible for Fair Housing Act enforcement from 1978
to 1982, stated:
[T]he most disturbing aspect of the Reagan Administration's stewardship
of the Civil Rights Division [of the Justice Department] has been the
unprecedented extent to which it has undermined the Division's tradition
of incrementally progressive, nonpolitical law enforcement. The difficulties
of the early Nixon years pale in comparison to the negative ideological
agenda, and the failure to appreciate the obligations of responsible law
enforcement, that now hold sway.
Selig, supra note 4, at 504 n.232.
61 See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
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tudes of present and future administrations. 69 Absent certainty
of enforcement, conciliation will remain a futile undertaking.
2. Agency Power Allows for More Effective
and Expeditious Resolution of Disputes
Proponents also argue that administrative enforcement
power is a more effective and expeditious remedy for com-
plainants. 70 Administrative enforcement power would grant
HUD dual enforcement powers. One such power is "cease and
desist" power. With this power, HUD could "freeze the status
quo pending the resolution of a complaint." ' 71 Should the con-
ciliation process .break down, then HUD would need admin-
istrative enforcement power to conduct hearings and issue
orders resolving the dispute. This second type of power often
includes the power to assess penalties.72
Preliminary cease and desist power, because it enjoins
defendant housing providers from selling or renting the dwell-
ings denied the complainant, tends to speed dispute resolu-
tion. 73 Absent HUD cease and desist power, violators of the
Fair Housing Act tend to "test out" HUD in every instance,
delaying the process at every turn.74 This cease and desist power
serves one other important function: it assures the complainant
that if, in fact, he has been discriminated against in violation
of the Act, the unit sought will not be rented to another while
the conciliation process takes place.
75
11 Admittedly, HUD like the Justice Department, is subject to a change in policy
with each change in administration. However, while Justice enforcement under present
and proposed mechanisms is discretionary, HUD enforcement would be mandatory in
the event that the concilliation fails. But see Selig, supra note 4, at 504 n.232 (questioning
whether HUD's past record lends any support to the idea that it will be more diligent
than the Justice Department in enforcing the fair housing laws).
See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 651-
53 (legal memorandum prepared by Congressional Research Service concerning argu-
ments for and against granting HUD cease and desist authority for Fair Housing Act
enforcement).
,, Id. at 651-52.
71 See ScswARTz, AD rmSTATiVE LAW 79-81 (2d ed. 1984).
11 See Fair Housing Amendments of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 651-52.
14 Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 66 (statement of Drew Days III).
" See id. at 305. One General Accounting Office (G.A.O.) report on Title VIII
enforcement found that during one three-year period, HUD resolved only thirty-six of
1985-86]
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When arguing that the administrative process is expedi-
tious, its proponents point to the relatively simple questions of
law and fact often presented by housing discrimination cases.
These questions, it is argued, can best be resolved in an ad-
ministrative setting.76 One survey found that discrimination in
the market place usually takes the form of higher sales or
rental prices, higher interest rates, longer waiting periods, higher
down payments, and fewer showings of homes or apartments. 7
A random selection of cases revealed that most housing dis-
crimination suits involve simple allegations of discrimination, 7s
and once evidence is collected, the proof necessary to establish
the violation is not complex.
7 9
Another advantage of the administrative enforcement
mechanism that advocates say makes the process more expe-
ditious is its simplicity. 0 Rules of evidence and prehearing pro-
cedures are all but ignored in an administrative hearing.
Defendants can also participate without the expense of hiring
counsel.8 Because hearings can be held close to the parties
involved, many proponents believe the administrative process
is also more convenient. 2
The goal of any secondary enforcement mechanism should
be to facilitate the obtaining of housing. Speed, therefore, is
particularly important. 3 Granting HUD the power to obtain
preliminary or injunctive relief pending the outcome of the
conciliation process not only speeds the process but also as-
sures that, in cases in which the housing is still available when
the complaint is filed, the unit will be available when a set-
the 332 complaints received by the G.A.O. Of those resolved, the complainant obtained
the unit in only four instances. Id. But see S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7, at 19
(1983) (granting Secretary of HUD the power only to refer the matter to the Attorney
General if it appears that temporary or preliminary relief is necessary).
76 See H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 5.
" See id.
" See id. at 5 n.17 (citing HUD, Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
Remedies Obtained Through Litigation of Fair Housing Cases: Title VIII and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 2 (1979)).
See id. at 5.
fo See id.
See id.
62 See id. at 6.
See id. at 5-6.
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tlement is reached. If conciliation breaks down, the relative
simplicity of the agency hearing process provides an
inexpensive 4 and prompt settlement to the dispute., Even the
Reagan Administration, critical of the agency approach in gen-
eral,8 6 admits that housing discrimination cases are not easily
resolved in federal court.87 The relative simplicity of housing
discrimination suits and the low monetary amount in contro-
versy do not fit well into the federal court system.88 For these
reasons, granting HUD enforcement power seems to provide
the simplest and most convenient method for assuring injured
parties prompt and effective relief.
The need for a quick, simple, and effective resolution to
housing discrimination disputes is clear. At present, HUD re-
views approximately 4,500 to 5,000 complaints yearly. 9 Given
the extensiveness of discrimination in the United States, 9° this
is a paltry figure. As victims of discrimination come to view
the overall agency process as a fast, inexpensive, and success-
ful response to racial discrimination in housing, more com-
plaints will be filed.9 By the same token, as defendants come
1 See notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text for a discussion, in another
context, of the costs of privately litigating a fair housing case.
11 But see Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4-5. Administration
officials admit that an agency hearing is quicker than a court trial. Nevertheless, they
point out that "the difference is not likely to be critical in terms of the objective related
to the remedy sought." Id. at 5.
11 See generally id. at 4-6.
17 See Remarks by John J. Knapp, General Counsel for HUD, before the Arlington
Young Republicans, Arlington Va., at 7 (Apr. 19, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Remarks
by John J. Knapp to Young Republicans].
' See id.
See Remarks of John J. Knapp, General Counsel for HUD, at the HUD Fair
Housing Testing Conference, at 2-3 (Dec. 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Remarks of John
J. Knapp at HUD Conference].
' , "In 1980, HUD estimated that more than 2 million instances of housing dis-
crimination occur each year." 129 CONG. REC. S6152 (daily ed. May 5, 1983) (state-
ment of Sen. Mathias introducing Senate Bill 1220).
"I See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 653.
Former Secretary Harris summed up this position best when testifying before Congress
in favor of House Resolution 3504, granting HUD administrative enforcement power:
I would venture a curbstone judgment that people don't usually undertake
useless acts, and if it is apparent that there is not much point in bringing
a complaint because one may have lots of meetings and lots of discussion,
but there will be no remedy and certainly no quick remedy, the average
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
to view HUD's enforcement potential as a realistic threat, more
of those complaints will be conciliated without resort to an
agency hearing.
B. Arguments By Opponents of Administrative Enforcement
Authority
1. Recent Agency Enforcement Proposals Have
Encumbered the Dispute Resolution Process
The original 1977 proposed amendment (H.R. 3504) to the
Fair Housing Act92 gave HUD broad administrative enforce-
ment powers including the power to investigate charges of dis-
crimination, 93 issue cease and desist orders, 94 conduct hearings
on the record, 95 and issue orders providing relief, which in-
cluded money damages, injunctive relief, and punitive dam-
ages. 96 In short, HUD was given all of the remedial power of
a federal court without procedural requirements such as dis-
covery and pleading which tend to slow the decision-maldng
process. 97 In this manner, drafters of the legislation thought
that remedies for housing discrimination could be awarded
quickly and efficiently.98
Subsequent proposals, responding to several specific criti-
cisms, have given HUD far more restricted powers. This was
complainant is not likely to come into the process. This is why I feel very
strongly that we need enforcement potential.
Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 27.
91 H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in Fair Housing Act, Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 422.
91 See id. § 208, at 5.
See id. § 208, at 8-9.
5 See id.
16 See id. § 208, at 8-9, 13-14.
9, See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 3-4.
" See id. One of the earliest criticisms of House Resolution 3504 was directed at
the resolution's elimination of any reference to the conciliation process. Former Secretary
Harris, with the support of former Assistant Attorney General Drew S. Days III, urged
the recognition of the conciliation process "as a desirable first step in remedying
discriminatory housing practices." Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 7. In
fact, evidence has shown that the conciliation process, when successful, can be more
speedy and efficient than the administrative hearing process. The average amount of
time required to complete HUD conciliation proceedings is about one hundred days,
while the administrative hearing process takes about 229 days. See Administration and
S. 1220, supra note 14, at 5.
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particularly evident in proposed Senate Bill 1220,99 the most
recent measure designed to place agency powers in the hands
of HUD officials. Continuing to direct the Secretary of HUD
to investigate'00 any charge of discriminatory housing practice,
Senate Bill 1220 gave cease and desist power to the Attorney
General if the Secretary decided that prompt judicial action
was necessary.'0 ' According to administration officials, this
change resulted because cease and desist authority is rare in
federal statutes'0 2 and too controversial a power for an ad-
ministrative agency to exercise in a context as sensitive as fair
housing law. 03
Unlike the original amendments, Senate Bill 1220 would
have delegated the power to conduct hearings to an adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ)1' 4 rather than to the Secretary of HUD.
The Secretary of HUD's role would have become that of an
advocate, representing the complainant in the agency hearing.
In addition, Senate Bill 1220 would have established a Fair
Housing Review Commission composed of three members ap-
pointed by the President. 0 5 This commission would have ap-
pointed the ALJs, heard appeals from hearings conducted by
the ALJs, and issued final orders'06 which would then have
been reviewable in the appropriate federal circuit courts of ap-
peals.' o7
This drastic change in the hearing process resulted from
the classic "judge-prosecutor-jury" criticism.105 Critics feared
S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
' In both Senate Bill 1220 and House Resolution 3504, the Secretary of HUD was
given not only the power to act when an aggrieved person filed a charge, but also the
power to act on his or her own initiative. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, at 14
(1983); H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208, at 5.
- See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, at 19-20. See also text accompanying
notes 73-75 supra discussing the importance of preliminary cease and desist power.
1,2 See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4. But see Fair Housing Act,
Hearings, supra note 6, at 686-717 (federal administrative authority to issue cease and
desist orders found in sixteen federal agencies).
1' See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4.
So, 5. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7, at 21.
See id. § 6(a), at 1I.
See id. at 10-12.
See id. § 7, at 22.
,c See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 208
(legal memorandum submitted by the National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing). See also Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4.
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that without a "separation of functions" within the agency,
the investigatory or prosecutorial arm of the agency might con-
trol a hearing or influence an agency head in his or her role
as judge.109 This, critics argue, would violate the defendant's
due process rights." 0
While it is no longer disputed that placing investigative and
adjudicative functions in the same agency is consistent with
due process if there is an appropriate separation of adminis-
trative functions,"' Senate Bill 1220 went to an extreme to
avoid the possibility of bias. The bill addressed the problem
of improper influence by creating the Fair Housing Review
Commission and placing the ALJs outside the authority and
control of HUD." 2 In so doing, however, the bill created yet
another appeals board through which a complainant had to
109 Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal
Level, 65 JuDIcATuRE 266, 272 (1981).
110 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 656
(Congressional Research Service memorandum concerning arguments for and against
granting HUD cease and desist power).
- See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975) (combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions in one agency does not unconstitutionally risk denial of due
process). According to Section 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, proper
separation of administrative functions within agencies requires that:
The employee who presides at the reception of evidence ... may not...
be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting func-
tions for an agency....
[A]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review pursuant to Section 557 of this title, except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982).
M No doubt, this was the result of strong criticism aimed at House Resolution
5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980), concerning the supposed bias inherent in having
HUD ALJs hear HUD-investigated cases. See 38 CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP.
1175 (1980). When House Resolution 5200 came before the House and Senate in 1980,
some of the strongest criticism came from the National Association of Realtors (N.A.R.).
One realtor described the powers given to HUD as "down right scary." The N.A.R.'s
general counsel, Bill North, revealing a somewhat cynical attitude toward the agency
process, said: "There's no question those judges will be paid by HUD, vill operate in
HUD facilities, will be hired by HUD, and their promotions will be determined by
HUD." Id. at 1176.
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pass before enforcement of a final order." 3 According to op-
ponents, what was once designed as a speedy, efficient process
had now been slowed by the burden of excess due process
protection." 4 For this reason, the Reagan Administration op-
posed this approach and instead supported a judicial process
as the sole backup mechanism to conciliation."'
The Reagan Administration argued that the best procedure
for achieving the objectives of swift and non-burdensome relief
is the conciliation process. 1 6 While agency enforcement and
Justice Department litigation would theoretically enhance con-
ciliation in the same manner," 7 the Administration maintained
that litigation had the advantage of self-enforcement, while
HUD procedures entailed possibly two appeals and then a civil
action to enforce the order."3 In the Administration's view,
agency enforcement would be neither more efficient nor more
speedy.' 9
" S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), required that no order issued by an ALJ
become a final order until after the Fair Housing Review Commission had reviewed that
order and affirmed it. See id. § 6(a), at 11-12. If the defendant failed to appeal to the
Review Commission, the order became final after thirty days. See id. Nevertheless, this
final order was itself appealable to an appropriate federal circuit court of appeals.
Finally, any final order, either by the agency or the Commission, as a practical matter,
had to be enforced by the Attorney General in a civil action. See id. § 7, at 25.
"4 See note 119 infra.
" See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 3-4.
"' See note 98 supra explaining that HUD conciliations take about one hundred
days to complete while administrative hearings take about 230 days. See also Remarks
by John J. Knapp to Young Republicans, supra note 87, at 3-4 (quoting President
Reagan's remarks introducing Senate Bill 1612).
"I But see notes 63-69 supra and accompanying text discussing the negative effects
on the conciliation process of a Justice Department that lacks enthusiasm for fair housing
enforcement.
"I See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4. See also note 113 supra
listing the various options under Senate Bill 1220.
"' In a recent address, John J. Knapp, General Counsel for HUD, explained the
Administration's view in the following manner:
I believe that the primary thrust of both proposals is to devise an efficient
means of dealing, without undue expense of money or time, with simple
cases of discrimination against individuals - the so-called garden variety
cases. We think that the procedures contained in the Mathias proposals
don't meet that objective; they aren't efficient, with their multiple review
lawyers, and the unlimited remedial powers of the administrative law judge
and the review commission aren't sufficiently tailored to permit confidence
that what is seen as a simple case when it starts out will remain one.
Remarks by John Knapp to Young Republicans, supra note 87, at 6-7.
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2. Constitutional Limitations Restrict
Monetary Relief to Complainants
The administrative enforcement mechanism is particularly
vulnerable to the charge that it is too limited in the kinds of
remedies that can be awarded plaintiffs. 20 This limitation re-
sults because agencies, unlike courts, do not utilize the jury
system.12 ' Constitutionally, there are limits on the types of
monetary damages that can be awarded absent a jury deter-
mination of liability. 22 The scope of this constitutional limi-
tation is the source of substantial debate. 23
As originally drafted, the early amendments to Title VIII
granted HUD the authority to award compensatory damages,
including punitive damages to the aggrieved party. 24 These same
remedies were available to private plaintiffs bringing civil ac-
tions in a court of law.'25 Critics were quick to cite the 1974
Supreme Court opinion, Curtis v. Loether, 26 holding that the
"Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury
trial in an action for damages in the federal courts under Sec-
tion 812 [Section 3612 of Title VIII]."' 27 Accordingly, it was
argued, the scope of agency enforcement power must be lim-
ited to civil penalties payable to the government and injunctive
relief only, because any award of either actual or punitive
,20 See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 4-6.
,2, See SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 71.
,22 The seventh amendment provides that "in suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
"2 See Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 644 (congressional research
memorandum concerning HUD's enforcement powers [hereinafter cited as Cong. Re-
search Memorandum]); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note
37, at 38 (National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing [NCADH] memoran-
dum concerning the constitutionality of HUD administrative enforcement of Title VIII
through provision of monetary relief to complainants [hereinafter cited as NCADH
Memorandum]); Fair Housing Act: Hearings, supra note 6, at 15 (memorandum of
Larry Hammond, Deputy Assist. U.S. Atty. Gen., Office of Legal Counsel [hereinafter
cited as Memorandum of Larry Hammond]).
-2- See H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208, at 430-31, 435-36.
321 See id. at 435-36; 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982).
,26 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
327 Id. at 192.
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damages to the complainant would violate the defendant's sev-
enth amendment rights.'
23
Subsequent versions of the proposed amendments have each
excluded language allowing HUD to award punitive dam-
ages.' 29 As a deterrent,'30 more recent proposals have granted
HUD the power to assess civil penalties of up to $10,000.3'
ALJs have also been authorized to issue an order providing
such relief "as may be appropriate (including compensation
for all damages suffered by the aggrieved person as a result
of the discriminatory housing practice)."'3 2 The scope of these
so-called compensatory damages remains the focus of some de-
bate.'a
Proponents of the administrative enforcement mechanism
point out that, without authority in HUD to order monetary
relief for the aggrieved party in the form of expenses and "out-
of-pocket" loss resulting from the discriminatory conduct, the
successful complainant cannot be made whole. 34 It is correctly
noted that any "remedial gap is of great public importance in
that it threatens to undermine the integrity and utility of the
'2 See Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 5-6 (testimony of Patricia
Harris, former Secretary of HUD). Former Secretary Harris suggested that rather than
allow HUD to assess damages, the Resolution [House Resolution 3504] should be
amended, on the basis of Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), to allow HUD to assess civil penalties payable to the
Government. Atlas makes clear that such penalties, based on a substantial public interest
such as the interest in providing fair housing, would survive seventh amendment attack.
Fair Housing Act, Hearings, supra note 6, at 6.
"Provision for equitable relief in the form of temporary or permanent injunctions
in no way offends the Seventh Amendment's preservation of juries in 'suits at common
law'." Memorandum of Larry Hammond, supra note 123, at 18. See also R. ScHxvamm,
supra note 26, at 397-98.
12 See H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §
7, at 21-22 (1983).
"' H.R. REP. No. 865, supra note 28, at 21.
See H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1980); S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §
7, at 22 (1983). This provision is apparently the result of Secretary Harris's comments
concerning House Resolution 3504. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
See S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7, at 22 (1983).
' Attorney's fees and other related costs of bringing the complaint before the
agency were covered by Senate Bill 1220. Because these are beyond the scope of the
seventh amendment right to jury trial, ALJs can award them without being in violation
of the U.S. Constitution. See Bixton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1979). See
also R. SCHWEMM, supra note 26, at 397.
"I See NCADH Memorandum, supra note 123, at 42.
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administrative process as an enforcement mechanism."' 3 5 Ac-
knowledging that there is no definitive answer to the seventh
amendment question, 36 proponents argue, on the basis of At-
las Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n,'37 that the jury right turns not only on the nature
of the issue to be decided, but also "on the forum in which
it is to be resolved."' 33 Citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 139 proponents note that the Supreme Court upheld an
award of back pay by the NLRB without a jury trial.140 In
that opinion the Court held the seventh amendment not ap-
plicable in an administrative forum where a jury trial is in-
compatible with the concept of administrative adjudication. 4'
Because HUD's role "in protecting against housing discrimi-
nation would be functionally identical to the role of the NLRB
in protecting against unfair labor practices,"' 42 proponents ar-
gue that just as the NLRB's authority to award back pay has
been upheld, so too will HUD's power to award out-of-pocket
expenses.143
Even if courts were to accept this argument,' 44 complain-
ants would still be left uncompensated for nonquantifiable types
I)$ Id.
"6 Id. at 43.
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
13 Id. at 460-61. See NCADH Memorandum, supra note 123, at 46-47.
'3 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
,, See NCADH Memorandum, supra note 123, at 56.
Id. (citing 415 U.S. at 194).
142 Id.
143 See id.
I' The NCADH Memorandum, supra note 123, misconstrues a fundamental com-
ponent of the law related to a jury right in the context of administrative proceedings.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, remains the definitive case in this area. NCADH
apparently argues that it is the forum that dictates the jury right. See NCADH Memo-
randum, supra note 123, at 58. Curtis, however, makes clear that simply allowing rights
to be adjudicated by the agency process does not, in and of itself, dispense with the
jury right where those same rights can also be adjudicated in a federal court. See 415
U.S. at 195.
Although an administrative action is statutorily created and therefore did not exist
at common law, this does not decide the seventh amendment question. As the Curtis
Court states: "[I]f the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action
for damages in the ordinary courts of law," then the seventh amendment does apply.
Id. at 194.
Broadly speaking, the seventh amendment does not apply where Congress has
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of injury such as embarrassment and humiliation.'4 - This re-
medial gap is significant because, as one Administration offi-
cial has pointed out, these "intangible damages such as
humiliation and distress . . ., in a damage sense, are the most
meaningful part of the recovery in most housing discrimination
cases."'"46 In Title VIII cases, where out-of-pocket expenses are
usually minimal, 47 the absence of an ability to award damages
for embarrassment and humiliation is a serious flaw with which
proponents of the administrative enforcement mechanism must
reckon.'
41
properly assigned the adjudicatory function to an administrative tribunal with whose
proceedings the use of a jury trial would be incompatible. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court in Atlas Roofing limited the jury-free administrative proceeding to those instances
where "public rights" were involved. 430 U.S. at 458. The crucial question then becomes,
"What are 'public rights'?"
This important distinction was made in Crowel v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932),
where the Court sustained the role of an administrative tribunal in awarding relief under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Holding that the pro-
ceedings were adjunct to the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction and thus presented
no seventh amendment problem, the Court characterized the case at bar as "one of
private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined." Id. at 51. Here, the Court focused not only on the role of the Act created by
Congress but also on the nature of the liability created. This comports with Atlas
Roofing, where the liability created was to the government in the form of a civil penalty.
See also Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70
(1982) (Court upheld the public/private right distinction found in Crowell v. Benson).
But see B. ScmvARTz, ADMINISTRATVE LAW § 2.19, at 67-69 & § 2.21, at 71-72 (2d ed.
1984) (author considers the distinction between public and private rights unwarranted).
It can be concluded from the above that (1) more than a simple "public interest"
is necessary to come within the phrase "public right" as used in Atlas Roofing; and (2)
the nature of the relief afforded by the agency tribunal is relevant for seventh amendment
purposes. Merely because a government agency plays a role in adjudicating rights
pursuant to stated public policy does not mean a "public right" is involved. When the
liability created is between individuals in the form of private damages, even though that
liability is created pursuant to a public policy to end discrimination, Crowell and
Marathon Pipe Line say that the "right" is a private one. For this reason, it is unlikely
that even actual damages in the form of out-of-pocket expenses will survive a constitu-
tional challenge.
"' See R. ScHwar.M, supra note 26, at 255-60.
" Remarks by John J. Knapp to Young Republicans, supra note 87, at 7.
'" See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973)
(economic injuries limited to $13.25 in telephone expenses and $125.00 in moving and
storage expenses).
"I See notes 212-213 infra and accompanying text, which attempt to answer this
criticism.
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Reagan Administration officials argue that, while the lan-
guage of Senate Bill 1220 attempted to encompass the assess-
ment of "compensation for all damages suffered,"'
' 49
compensatory damages for humiliation and mental distress "are
legal damages which constitutionally cannot be awarded except
by a court after a jury trial."' 50 The Supreme Court's decision
in Curtis v. Loether, 5' where a damages action under Section
812 [Section 3612(c)] of Title VIII was described as an action
to enforce "legal rights" within the meaning of the seventh
amendment supports this argument.1
52
A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort
- the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes
the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by
the defendant's wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeals
noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort
actions recognized at common law." 3
Unlike out-of-pocket expenses, damages for embarrassment
and humiliation fall squarely within the kind of damages that
Curtis enunciates can be assessed only after a jury trial. 154 Thus,
it would appear that administrative tribunals are, in fact, lim-
ited as to the kinds of damages they can award - if they can
award them at all.
3. Agency Action in Effect Cuts
Off Rights to Legal Damages
The limitation on administrative damages awards leads to
a third criticism of the administrative enforcement mechanism
as proposed in Senate Bill 1220. The bill prevented a com-
plainant from initiating a private action after the Secretary had
S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7, at 22 (1983).
': Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 9.
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
'2 Id. at 195.
' Id. The court likened a suit for racial discrimination to an action for defamation
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 195 n.10.
"-' The Curtis Court notes that it need not go so far as to assert that "any award
of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." Id. at 196. It is here, apparently,
that some would argue that out-of-pocket expenses can be assessed by an agency without
violating the seventh amendment. But see note 144 supra.
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already commenced an administrative hearing.'55 Some argue
that this would "cut off" the right of the complainant to seek
legal damages in a subsequent civil action.'
5 6
The bill need not be interpreted so restrictively, however.
Senate Bill 1220 specifically provided for a two year statute of
limitations.'5 7 The statute itself did not purport to "cut off"
any private civil action but rather precluded a defendant from
having to defend himself in two forums at one time.' 58 Given
the two year statutory bar to a right of action, it is conceiv-
able that there would still be time to commence a civil action
after the close of the HUD proceeding.
4. HUD Has No Commitment to Fair Housing
Enforcement
One final criticism of the administrative enforcement mech-
anism relates to the suitability of HUD to carry out the ob-
jectives of the Fair Housing Act. Some critics believe that HUD
is fundamentally indifferent to fair housing. 59 Drawing on
HUD's history of indifference to racial and economic segre-
gation, documented in studies by the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights and others, these critics say there is little
indication that HUD is capable of making affirmative action
in fair housing the policy of the nation.'60 One study revealed
that HUD had consistently failed to begin investigating com-
plaints until long after they had been submitted, often as long
as one hundred days after HUD received a complaint.' 6' All
this leads to the important question whether HUD can use
'I See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, at 24 (1983).
See Administration and S. 1220, supra note 14, at 10.
' See S. 1220, supra note 15, § 7, at 24.
" Senate Bill 1220 provides only that an approved party "shall not commence a
civil action ... if the Secretary ... has commenced a hearing on the record." Id.
"I See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 661
(memorandum concerning arguments for and against granting HUD cease and desist
authority).
10 See id. (citing Paul Davidoff and Mary E. Brooks of the Suburban Action
Institute). See also Selig, supra note 4, at 504, n.233 ("Regardless, HUD's record of
performance does not inspire confidence .... ).
,", See General Accounting Office, Stronger Federal Enforcements Needed to Up-
hold Fair Housing Laws 23-24 (1978).
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effectively the administrative mechanism it believes is so nec-
essary to the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act.
Most of these criticisms surfaced during the Fair Housing
Act hearings in 1978162 and related to a back-log of "over-
age" complaints. 63 Largely due to the efforts of then-Secretary
of HUD Patricia Harris, a new complaint processing mecha-
nism was instituted that reduced the back-log of "over-age"
complaints from 817 to forty-eight. 64 HUD also reduced from
ninety days to sixty days the length of time a complaint could
remain open without being classified as "over-age.' ' 65 It should
also be remembered that at this time HUD first began ex-
pressing the need for agency enforcement power. 66 In fact,
rather than point out some fundamental flaw in HUD's ability
to enforce Title VIII, these criticisms highlight the need for a
back-up mechanism to conciliation.
One other program proposed in early 1978 in response to
criticisms of HUD, the Fair Housing Assistance Program, 67
has become one of HUD's most successful. 65 Devised to pro-
vide incentives for state agencies administering the fair housing
laws, 69 the program uses funds to assist state and local gov-
ernments in processing HUD-referred complaints and thereby
to assist HUD in enforcing Title VIII. 170 The program allows
various state agencies, such as the Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights, to act as partners with the federal government
in enforcing the fair housing laws.
One way to evaluate the potential success of allowing HUD
administrative enforcement power is to look more closely at
states presently having the administrative power to enforce Ti-
tle VIII in a way that HUD has not. What follows is an ex-
"I See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
,63 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 89
(letter of Patricia Harris, former Secretary of HUD, responding to Dr. Arthur Flemming,
former Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
164 Id. at 91-92.
65 Id. at 92.
See id. at 92-93.
167 Id. at 93.
'1 See notes 175-176 infra and accompanying text.
,69 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings, supra note 37, at 93
(letter of former Secretary Harris to former Chairman Flemming).
170 Id.
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amination of one such agency - the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights.
III. THE STATE'S ROLE IN FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT
Title VIII provides that "wherever a State or local fair
housing law provides rights and remedies for alleged discrim-
inatory housing practices which are substantially equivalent to
the rights and remedies provided in this subchapter,"' 7' the
Secretary of HUD shall notify that state or local agency of
the complaint and shall take no further action on the matter
unless that agency fails to act.' 72 At present, thirty-three states
73
and fifty-seven localities 74 have laws that HUD has certified
to be "substantially equivalent" to the Fair Housing Act. As
a result, the percentage of complaints referred to state and
local agencies has grown from 7 percent in 1979 to 67 percent
in 1984.175 Clearly, the action is shifting toward the states.
76
A. State Agency Enforcement Has Encouraged Conciliation
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act 77 is one of the most compre-
hensive in the nation. 78 This fact, coupled with the adminis-
trative enforcement powers granted to Kentucky's Human
Rights Commission ("the Commission' 1),179 makes the Com-
mission's experience particularly instructive when evaluating the
effectiveness of an agency with broad enforcement power.
While the Commission receives as many as five hundred
housing-related inquiries in a year, only a fraction are actually
" 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1982).
- See id.
" Remarks by John Knapp at HUD Conference, supra note 89, at 2.
114 Id.
171 Id.
"I Note that this rise in state involvement has coincided with the development of
the Fair Housing Assistance Program (F.H.A.P.). See id. at 1. Last year's F.H.A.P.
budget was nearly five billion dollars. See HUD, FY 1986 Budget at FHEO 7 (Summ.
Feb. 1985).
" Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.010-.450 (Baldwin 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
,7 Interview with Samuel H. DeShazer, Assistant Compliance Director, Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights, in Louisville, Kentucky (Feb. 28, 1985) [hereinafter cited
as DeShazer Interview].
I , See KRS §§ 344.150-290; 104 Ky. ADMIN. REcs. 1:020 (1985).
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"docketed" for agency investigation. 8 ° Last year, the Com-
mission docketed only thirteen complaints. 3' Previously, the
Commission averaged between forty and fifty complaints per
year.3 2 Of those docketed, the vast majority were either dis-
missed for lack of probable cause 83 or conciliated'8 in the
same manner that HUD conciliates many of its complaints.
According to one Commission attorney, the presence of an
agency enforcement mechanism is most certainly an incentive
to conciliate.8 5
The Commission has only seven full time staff attorneys
doing all housing, employment, and public accommodations
work, yet the staff resolves many disputes in as little as one
month.8 6 The average amount of time spent in reaching con-
ciliation is close to that found at HUD - one hundred days.3
7
Under Kentucky law, if conciliation is not reached within
sixty days, then the hearing process begins.' 88 In the past, the
Commission has averaged between two and three hearings an-
nually. 8 9 Considering that, except in 1984, the Commission has
averaged forty to fifty complaints per year, the percentage of
potential defendants that actually go before a hearing is min-
iscule.190 This percentage lends strong support to the HUD as-
". DeShazer Interview, supra note 178. The Commission dockets only those com-
plaints that it feels have merit. This initial screening is distinguishable from a finding of
probable cause, which is a necessary determination before a conciliation conference can
be called pursuant to KRS § 344.200(2).
' See KENTUCKY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, CUMULATIVE REPORT (1984-85).
See KENTUCKY HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMfissIoN, CMUlATIVE REPORT (1978-83). The
substantial discrepancy from years past is due in part to the inavailability of F.H.A.P.
funds with which to finance statewide testing programs. DeShazer Interview, supra note
178.
See KRS § 344.200(2).
See KRS § 344.200(4).
83 Telephone interview with Tom Ebendorf, Compliance Director, Kentucky Com-
mission on Human Rights (Feb. 26, 1985).
1 DeShazer Interview, supra note 178.
19 Id.
' See KRS § 344.210(1).
'9 See, e.g., KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, CuMuLATrva REPORTS
(1978-84).
110 It is impossible to arrive at a precise percentage calculation because the statistics
kept by the Commission record only yearly totals, not individual cases. See, e.g., id.
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sertion that a hearing process would bring people to the
conciliation table.' 9'
B. Agency Enforcement Requires Federal Initiative
In comparing federal fair housing efforts under HUD to
states' efforts, states have two advantages. First, in the area
of damages, state agencies such as Kentucky's Commission are
not subject to the limitations found in Curtis v. Loether 92 con-
cerning damages for embarrassment and humiliation. In Ken-
tucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Fraser,93 the Kentucky
Supreme Court -held that there was no constitutional infirmity
in the extension of adjudicatory powers to a state administra-
tive agency, even to determine liability between individuals for
such intangible damages as embarrassment and humiliation. 94
This means that Kentucky complainants will not risk losing
damage claims by opting for the state agency route rather than
the private litigation route.
95
Second, the local nature of housing discrimination prob-
lems also gives state agencies, like the Kentucky Commission,
an advantage because, unlike HUD, state agencies are local
investigatory bodies. Thus, travel and expenses are minimal.
HUD investigators, on the other hand, often must travel long
distances across state lines to investigate alleged housing dis-
crimination. 9 6 This fact, coupled with damage award capabil-
ity, makes it tempting to argue that perhaps all enforcement
authority under the Fair Housing Act should be handed over
to the states. Certainly, the move toward more state involve-
ment should be encouraged. Nonetheless, not even the states'
rights conscious Reagan Administration takes the position that
all authority should be given up. In his message to Congress
' ' See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
,, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). See also R. SCHNVEMM, supra note 26, at 397.
'10 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981).
04 See id. at 854. See generally Damages for Embarrassment and Humiliation in
Discrimination Cases, Kentucky Human Rights Commission, Staff Report 82-1 & Staff
Report 82-8 (1982).
" KRS § 344.450 preserves a civil cause of action for those who so choose.
For example, the HUD regional office nearest to Kentucky is in Atlanta, Geor-
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introducing Senate Bill 1612,197 President Reagan pointed out
that the Federal Fair Housing Act remained just that - a fed-
eral act embodying national policy. Accordingly, he said,
"Vindication of federally protected civil rights is a federal right
that cannot be abdicated."' 19 Furthermore, few states, if any,
have both the agency power and the broadly phrased statute
found in Kentucky. While it may be true that Kentucky would
not quickly give up the struggle to end housing discrimination,
according to some, there are more than a few states that, with-
out federal initiative and support, would not continue to mon-
itor and control the problem.' 99
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
It is imperative that Congress act soon to adopt a logical
and consistent federal strategy for implementing the policy goals
of Title VIII. 00 The need for a federal strategy is clear. To
begin, Congress must pass authorizing legislation which will
allow HUD to implement its proposed Fair Housing Assistance
Program (FHAP).2 0' This program, with its tripartite emphasis
on state administrative enforcement and compliance, education
and outreach, and private enforcement, will provide a com-
prehensive approach to enforcement of fair housing legisla-
tion.20 2 It will also enable HUD to utilize in a more coordinated
fashion its primary "authority and responsibility for
administering ' 20 3 Title VIII.
While the goal of FHAP is to raise the consistently low
number of housing discrimination complaints received by fed-
eral, state and local enforcement agencies 204 (a goal shared by
S. 1612, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
"9 Remarks of John J. Knapp at HUD Conference, supra note 89, at 4.
' DeShazer Interview, supra note 178.
204 Senator Charles Mathais and other proponents of a new administrative enforce-
ment remedy similar to that suggested infra plan to introduce legislation into the Ninety-
ninth Congress in December of 1985. Telephone interview with Marion Morris, Staff Counsel
for Senator Mathias (Feb. 18, 1985).
"I See HUD, FY 1986 Budget at FHEO 7 (Summary Feb. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as HUD Budget].
202 See id. at FHEO 7-9.
0 3 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1982). See text accompanying note 1 supra.
204 See HUD Budget, supra note 201, at FHEO 7.
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proponents of a back-up mechanism to conciliation), 20 5 those
complaints still must be resolved. As stated above, conciliation
alone, without a back-up mechanism to ensure that injured
parties get a fair hearing, is often futile.2 06 This means Con-
gress must make a choice.
Congress must choose either to grant HUD administrative
enforcement power or to allow the Justice Department the
power to pursue individual victim cases referred to it by HUD.
Both proposals have merit. Each has problems as well. Per-
haps the proper course combines the better features of both
proposals.
The use of ALJs, without the interposition of a Fair Hous-
ing Review Commission, 20 7 is crucial to a middle ground ap-
proach. It is possible to assure defendants of due process
203
while avoiding the delay inherent in multiple levels of review.
While political acceptance of this approach may be more dif-
ficult, 20 9 the middle ground approach offers the best chance of
simple, efficient, and expedient resolution of housing dis-
putes. 2
10
Additionally, HUD's lack of administrative power to award
private damages21' makes the agency enforcement approach
vulnerable. Congress must grant the Justice Department the
power to pursue cases of individual discrimination as the Reagan
Administration argues, 2  and allow HUD officials, in their
discretion to refer cases to Justice if it appears that the com-
plainant has a good chance to recover substantial damages from
a jury. Moreover, because the complainant may also opt for
private litigation if his or her chances of recovery appear great,
HUD must be required to apprise plaintiffs of the limits, as
" See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
At this time, HUD officials, Justice Department officials, key congressmen, and
a coalition of civil rights groups are meeting to form a consensus. It appears that this
group is recognizing that ALJs, alone, offer the most expedient alternative to the present
conciliation process. Housing Affairs Letter 6 (Jan. 25, 1985) (unpublished).
See note IlI supra and accompanying text.
See note 112 supra.
See notes 70-88 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 120-154 supra and accompanying text.
20 See S. 1220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7, at 20 (1983).
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well as the benefits, of the hearing process before proceeding.
Nonetheless, in the "garden variety" discrimination case where
simple issues of law and fact are presented, there is no reason
to deny HUD the power to hear and resolve the dispute.1 3
CONCLUSION
From the beginning, HUD, charged with primary respon-
sibility for administering the Fair Housing Act, has been ham-
pered in its efforts by a lack of enforcement power.2 4 The
only means of enforcement has been a voluntary conciliation
conference which, absent an adequate back-up mechanism, has
been treated with little respect. Administration officials have
sharply criticized recent attempts to supply the needed incen-
tive to conciliate by granting HUD agency power. Pointing to
overly burdensome due process protections and to constitu-
tional limitations on the kinds of damages that agencies can
award, 2 5 the Reagan Administration has advocated enforce-
ment by the Justice Department. The Administration's pro-
posal has been criticized both for its lack of sincerity and for
its utilization of the ill-suited federal courts. Based in part on
the success of agency enforcement at the state level, a middle
ground approach has been presented.2 6 It has been suggested
that ALJs should work with HUD, thereby avoiding the cum-
bersome Review Commission. Moreover, constitutional limita-
tions on damages may be avoided both by allowing the Justice
Department to pursue certain cases and by informing com-
plainants of their options. The approach has merit because it
gives HUD the full power it was denied when the Fair Hous-
ing Act was originally enacted in 1968 while also recognizing
that, in some instances, enforcement power must be shared to
assure plaintiffs full compensation. Most importantly, the ap-
proach would be a major step by Congress toward fulfilling
the promise embodied in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968: the eradication of discrimination in housing.
21, See note 119 supra defining "garden variety" cases as simple cases of discrimi-
nation against individuals.
I" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 120-154 supra and accompanying text.
2,6 See notes 207-213 supra and accompanying text.
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